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Abstract
By slightly adapting two equivalent semantics of noncontingency operator, we obtain two
variants,  and⊞, with non-equivalent semantics. We show that on the class of models satisfying
any of five basic properties (i.e. seriality, reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, Euclidicity), the logic
L(), which has  as the sole modal primitive, is less expressive than the logic L(⊞), which has
⊞ as the sole modal primitive. We investigate the frame definability of both languages. We then
axiomatizeL(⊞) andL() over various classes of bimodal frames. Among other results, a notion
of morphisms, called ‘-morphisms’, are provided to show the completeness of axiomatizations
of L() over serial frames and also over symmetric frames.
1 Introduction
Past decades have witnessed a bunch of studies on noncontingency logic, see e.g. [Hum95, Kuh95,
Zol99, vdHL04, Ste08, FWvD14, FvD15, FWvD15, Fan18a, Fan18b, Fan19]. This logic is obtained
by enriching propositional logic with an important metaphysical notion — contingency, which dates
back to Aristotle [Bro67]. Intuitively, a proposition is contingent, if it is possibly true and also possibly
false; otherwise, it is noncontingent, i.e. necessarily true or necessarily false. In an epistemic setting,
contingency amounts to ‘ignorance’, and noncontingency amounts to ‘knowing whether’, which is
perhaps the closest knowing-wh companion to ‘knowing that’ (namely, standard propositional knowl-
edge) among various knowledge types [Wan16].
Formally, given a Kripke modelM = 〈S,R, V 〉, where S is a nonempty set of possible worlds,
R ⊆ S × S is called accessibility relation, and V is a valuation that assigns a set V (p) ⊆ S to each
propositional variable p, the formula ∆ϕ, read “it is noncontingent that ϕ”, is evaluated as follows:
M, s  ∆ϕ ⇐⇒ for all t, u ∈ S, if sRt and sRu,
then (M, t  ϕ⇐⇒M, u  ϕ). (DEF 1)
Equivalently,
M, s  ∆ϕ ⇐⇒ R(s)  ϕ or R(s)  ¬ϕ, (DEF 2)
where R(s)  ϕ means that ϕ is true at all successors of s w.r.t. R, and similarly for R(s)  ¬ϕ.
By slightly adapting the above semantics, we obtain two variants of ∆, denoted  and ⊞ respec-
tively, as follows.
M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ for all t, u, if sR1t and sR2u,
then (M, t  ϕ⇐⇒M, u  ϕ). (DEF 1’)
M, s  ⊞ϕ ⇐⇒ R1(s)  ϕ or R2(s)  ¬ϕ. (DEF 2’)
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It is not hard to see that (DEF 1) and (DEF 2) are, respectively, special cases of (DEF 1’) and
(DEF 2’) when R1 = R2 = R. This entails that both  and ⊞ are more general than∆. Moreover, as
 ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ but 2 ⊞ϕ ↔ ⊞¬ϕ (as we will see below), we may call  ‘general noncontingency’
and ⊞ ‘pseudo noncontingency’ operators. Unlike the fact that (DEF 1) is equivalent to (DEF 2),
(DEF 1’) and (DEF 2’) are not equivalent, that is, 2 ϕ↔ ⊞ϕ.
This paper investigates both operators. Roughly speaking, a proposition is generalized noncon-
tingent, if the proposition has the same truth value no matter whether you look at it in this way (R1)
or in that way (R2); and a proposition is pseudo noncontingent, if it is necessary in this way (R1), or
it is impossible in that way (R2). Whenever both ways are the same, both operators then become the
more-familiar noncontingency operator.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After introducing the syntax and semantics
of logic L() for generalized noncontingency and logic L(⊞) for pseudo noncontingency (Sec. 2),
we compare the relative expressivity of the two logics (Sec. 3), and investigate their frame definability
(Sec. 5) with the help of a notion of -morphisms (Sec. 4). We then axiomatize L(⊞) and L() over
various bimodal frames in Sec. 6 and Sec. 7, where the completeness of L() over serial frames and
also over symmetric frames are proved via the notion of -morphisms. We conclude with a few future
work in Sec. 8.
2 Syntax and semantics
Let P be a fixed nonempty set of propositional variables.
Definition 1 (Syntax). Where p ∈ P, the language L() of generalized noncontingency logic and the
language L(⊞) of pseudo noncontingency logic are defined inductively as follows.
L() : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ϕ
L(⊞) : ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | ⊞ϕ
ϕ and ⊞ϕ are read “it is generalized noncontingent that ϕ” and “it is pseudo noncontingent that
ϕ”, respectively. As we will see below, the comparisons between the two languages are interesting,
both in expressivity and in axiomatizations.
The languages are interpreted on bimodal models. To say thatM = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 is a bimodal
model, if S is a nonempty set of possible worlds, R1 and R2 are accessibility relations over S, and V
is a function assigning to each propositional variable a subset of S. A bimodal frame F is a bimodal
model without valuations. If R1 and R2 both possess a property P (such as seriality, reflexivity,
transitivity, symmetry, Euclidicity), then M (F) is called a P bimodal model (resp. a P bimodal
frame). Moreover, Ri(s) = {t ∈ S | sRit} for i = 1, 2.
Definition 2 (Semantics). Given a bimodal modelM = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 and s ∈ S, the semantics of
both languages is defined as follows.
M, s  p ⇐⇒ s ∈ V (p)
M, s  ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ M, s 2 ϕ
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ M, s  ϕ andM, s  ψ
M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ for all t, u, if sR1t and sR2u,
then (M, t  ϕ⇐⇒M, u  ϕ)
M, s  ⊞ϕ ⇐⇒ R1(s)  ϕ or R2(s)  ¬ϕ
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Where for i ∈ {1, 2}, Ri(s)  ϕ stands for “for all t ∈ Ri(s),M, t  ϕ”, and Ri(s) 2 ϕ for
the negation of this claim, that is, “for some t ∈ Ri(s), M, t 2 ϕ”. Obviously, when R1(s) = ∅ or
R2(s) = ∅, it holds vacuously thatM, s  ⊞ϕ andM, s  ϕ for all ϕ; if R1 = R2, then ⊞ = 
and each of them becomes an operator for noncontingency.
It is noteworthy remarking that  ϕ ↔ (⊞ϕ ∧ ⊞¬ϕ), as can be seen more clearly from an
alternative semantical definition for .
M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ (R1(s)  ϕ or R2(s)  ¬ϕ) and
(R1(s)  ¬ϕ or R2(s)  ϕ).
Consequently, ⊞ is deductively weaker than . In contrast, as Sec. 3 will show, ⊞ is deductively
stronger than , equivalently,  is expressively weaker than ⊞.1
Note that 2 ⊞ϕ ↔ ⊞¬ϕ but  ϕ ↔ ¬ϕ. To see the former, consider a model M =
〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 in which S = {s, t, u}, R1(s) = {t} and R2(s) = {u}, and V (p) = {t}. Then it
should be easily verified that s  ⊞p but s 2 ⊞¬p. This will matter when we look into the differences
between axiomatizations of ⊞-logics and of -logics.
We may define M, s  iϕ as Ri(s)  ϕ, where i ∈ {1, 2}, then ⊞ϕ is equivalent to 1ϕ ∨
2¬ϕ. The operator ⊞, writtenN
′′′ on [Hum16, p. 229], to our knowledge, has not been axiomatized
in the literature.
If we read iϕ as “the agent i believes that ϕ”, then it is not hard to see that the negation of
 characterizes the notion of weak belief-disagreement in [CP18]: one agent fails to believe one
proposition and the other fails to believe its negation. In that paper, the notion is mentioned in passing
only, which is based on serial bimodal frames.
On serial bimodal frames, the semantics of  is equivalent to
M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ (R1(s)  ϕ and R2(s)  ϕ) or (R1(s)  ¬ϕ and R2(s)  ¬ϕ).
The epistemic meaning of this definition is that agents 1 and 2 have the same knowledge about ϕ,
i.e. they both know ϕ, or they both know ¬ϕ; in a doxastic reading, it means ‘agents 1 and 2 have the
belief agreement on ϕ’.
To simplify the proofs later, we claim the following results, which should be easily verified.
Proposition 3. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j and Rj(s) 6= ∅. IfM, s  ϕ, thenM, s  ∆iϕ.
Note that the converse fails. For example, in a modelM, s has only a single Ri-successor t, and
another single Rj-successor u, whereas t and u have different truth values for ϕ. In spite of this, the
converse indeed holds when Ri(s) and Rj(s) has a common element.
Proposition 4. Suppose that R1(s) ∩R2(s) 6= ∅. IfM, s  ∆1ϕ ∧∆2ϕ, thenM, s  ϕ.
Corollary 5. Suppose that R1(s) ∩R2(s) 6= ∅. ThenM, s  ∆1ϕ ∧∆2ϕ iffM, s  ϕ.
3 Expressivity
This section compares the relative expressivity of L() and L(⊞). It turns out that the former is less
expressive than the latter on all five classes of basic bimodal models.
To make our presentation self-contained, we introduce some necessary technical terms.
1As for the definitions of ‘deductively weaker’ and ‘expressively weaker’, we refer to [Fan17].
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Definition 6. Let L1 and L2 be two languages that are interpreted on the same class of models C.
• L2 is at least as expressive as L1, notation: L1  L2, if for all ϕ ∈ L1, there exists ψ ∈ L2
such that for allM in C and all s inM, we have thatM, s  ϕ iffM, s  ψ.
• L1 and L2 are equally expressive, notation: L1 ≡ L2, if L1  L2 and L2  L1.
• L1 is less expressive than L2, notation: L1 ≺ L2, if L1  L2 but L2 6 L1.
Proposition 7. L() is less expressive than L(⊞) on the class of all bimodal models, the class of
serial bimodal models, the class of transitive bimodal models, the class of Euclidean bimodal models.
Proof. We have already seen that  is definable in L(⊞), as  ϕ ↔ ⊞ϕ ∧ ⊞¬ϕ. This entails that
L()  L(⊞).
To show L(⊞) 6 L(), consider the following serial, transitive, Euclidean bimodal models:
M t : p
1,2

s : p1oo 2 // u : ¬p
1,2

M′ t′ : ¬p
1,2

s′ : p1oo 2 // u′ : p
1,2

One can check thatM, s  ⊞p andM′, s′ 2 ⊞p, thus the L(⊞)-formula ⊞p can distinguish (M, s)
and (M′, s′).
However, (M, s) and (M′, s′) cannot be distinguished by any L()-formula. That is, for all
ϕ ∈ L(), we have (M, s  ϕ⇐⇒M′, s′  ϕ). The proof proceeds by induction on ϕ.
The base case and Boolean cases are straightforward. For the case ϕ, we have
M, s  ϕ
⇐⇒ (M, t  ϕ⇐⇒M, u  ϕ)
(∗)
⇐⇒ (M′, u′  ϕ⇐⇒M′, t′  ϕ)
⇐⇒ M′, s′  ϕ,
where (∗) holds since M, t  ϕ iffM′, u′  ϕ, and M, u  ϕ iffM′, t′  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L(), as
can be easily verified.
Proposition 8. L() is less expressive than L(⊞) on the class of symmetric bimodal models.
Proof. Again, L()  L(⊞). For the strict part, consider the following symmetric bimodal models:
M t : p 1 // s : poo 2 // u : ¬poo M′ t′ : ¬p 1 // s′ : poo 2 // u′ : poo
First,M, s  ⊞p butM′, s′ 2 ⊞p. This means that (M, s) and (M′, s′) can be distinguished by
L(⊞).
Second, as shown in Prop. 7, we can prove that for all ϕ ∈ L(),M, s  ϕ iffM′, s′  ϕ. Then
(M, s) and (M′, s′) cannot be distinguished by L().
Proposition 9. L() is less expressive than L(⊞) on the class of reflexive bimodal models.
Proof. Again, L()  L(⊞).
For the strict part, consider the following reflexive bimodal models:
M t : p
1,2

s : p1oo 2 //
1,2

u : ¬p
1,2

M′ t′ : ¬p
1,2

s′ : p1oo 2 //
1,2

u′ : p
1,2

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First,M, s  ⊞p butM′, s′ 2 ⊞p, thus ⊞p can distinguish (M, s) and (M′, s′).
However, no L()-formula can distinguish both pointed models. That is, for all ϕ ∈ L(), we
have (M, s  ϕ ⇐⇒ M′, s′  ϕ). The proof proceeds with induction on ϕ. We only consider the
nontrivial case ϕ.
M, s  ϕ
⇐⇒ (M, s  ϕ⇐⇒M, t  ϕ) and (M, s  ϕ⇐⇒M, u  ϕ) and (M, t  ϕ⇐⇒M, u  ϕ)
(∗)
⇐⇒ (M′, s′  ϕ⇐⇒M′, u′  ϕ) and (M, s′  ϕ⇐⇒M, t′  ϕ) and (M′, u′  ϕ⇐⇒M′, t′  ϕ)
⇐⇒ M′, s′  ϕ,
where (∗) is the case due to the induction hypothesis thatM, s  ϕ⇐⇒M′, s′  ϕ, and the fact that
M, t  ϕ iffM′, u′  ϕ, andM, u  ϕ iffM′, t′  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L(), as can be easily verified.
Remark 10. Note that in the proof of Prop. 9, M and M′ are both serial and transitive, but not
Euclidean; for instance, sR1t and sR1s but not tR1s, thus Prop. 7 cannot be shown by using the
constructed models in Prop. 9.
The clear-sighted reader may ask whether the Euclidean closures of M and M′ in Prop. 9 can
handle Prop. 7 (and even Prop. 8) uniformly. That is, if we construct modelsM andM′ as follows:
M t : p
1,2

1 // s : poo 2 //
1,2

u : ¬p
1,2

oo M′ t′ : ¬p
1,2

1 // s′ : poo 2 //
1,2

u′ : p
1,2

oo
then doesM, s  ϕ⇐⇒M′, s′  ϕ hold for all ϕ ∈ L()?
The answer seems negative. The reason is as follows: to show the case ϕ, that is, M, s 
ϕ⇐⇒M′, s′  ϕ, (as before) we need to prove thatM, t  ϕ⇐⇒M′, u′  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L()
(and alsoM, u  ϕ⇐⇒M′, t′  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L()), whose case ϕ relies on showing again that
M, s  ϕ⇐⇒M′, s′  ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L(). This is a vicious circle.
In comparison, this situation does not occur in the proofs of Prop. 7-Prop. 9; instead, as any point
x ∈ {t, u, t′, u′} in the proofs of those propositions has no two different successors with respect to R1
and R2, all formulas of the form ϕ are true at x.
4 -morphisms
In this section, we introduce a notion of -morphisms, which is useful in the proof of frame un-
definability and the completeness proof of L() over serial frames and also over symmetric frames
below.
Definition 11. Let M = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 and M
′ = 〈S′, R′1, R
′
2, V
′〉 be two bimodal models. A
function f : S → S′ is a -morphism fromM toM′, if for all x ∈ S,
(Var) For all p ∈ P, x ∈ V (p) iff f(x) ∈ V ′(p),
(Forth) For any y, z ∈ S, if xR1y and xR2z and f(y) 6= f(z), then f(x)R
′
1f(y) and f(x)R
′
2f(z),
(Back) For all y′, z′ ∈ S′, if f(x)R′1y
′ and f(x)R′2z
′ and y′ 6= z′, then there are y, z ∈ S such that
xR1y and xR2z and f(y) = y
′ and f(z) = z′.
We say thatM′ is a -morphic image ofM, if there is a surjective -morphism fromM toM′.
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The following result indicates that L()-formulas and L(⊞)-formulas are invariant under -
morphisms.
Proposition 12. LetM = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 and M
′ = 〈S′, R′1, R
′
2, V
′〉 be two bimodal models, and
let f be a -morphism fromM toM′. Then for all x ∈ S, for all ϕ ∈ L() ∪ L(⊞), we have
M, x  ϕ⇐⇒M′, f(x)  ϕ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ ∈ L() ∪ L(⊞). We only consider the nontrivial case ϕ and ⊞ϕ.
Suppose thatM, x 2 ϕ, to show thatM′, f(x) 2 ϕ. By supposition, there are y, z ∈ S such
that xR1y and xR2z and it is not the case that (M, y  ϕ⇐⇒M, z  ϕ). By induction hypothesis,
it is not the case that (M′, f(y)  ϕ ⇐⇒ M′, f(z)  ϕ), which implies that f(y) 6= f(z). Now
using (Forth), we obtain f(x)R′1f(y) and f(x)R
′
2f(z). Therefore,M
′, f(x) 2 ϕ.
Conversely, assume thatM′, f(x) 2 ϕ, to prove that M, x 2 ϕ. By assumption, there exist
y′, z′ ∈ S′ such that f(x)R′1y
′ and f(x)R′2z
′ and it is not the case that (M′, y′  ϕ⇐⇒M′, z′  ϕ).
It is clear that y′ 6= z′. Using (Back), we infer that there are y, z ∈ S such that xR1y and xR2z and
f(y) = y′ and f(z) = z′, and thus it is not the case that (M′, f(y)  ϕ ⇐⇒ M′, f(z)  ϕ). By
induction hypothesis, it is not the case that (M, y  ϕ⇐⇒M, z  ϕ). Therefore,M, x 2 ϕ.
Suppose thatM, x 2 ⊞ϕ, to prove thatM′, f(x) 2 ⊞ϕ. By supposition, there exists y ∈ S such
that xR1y and M, y 2 ϕ, and there exists z ∈ S such that xR2z and M, z 2 ¬ϕ (viz. M, z  ϕ).
By induction hypothesis, M′, f(y) 2 ϕ and M′, f(z)  ϕ, which implies that f(y) 6= f(z). Then
applying (Forth), we infer that f(x)R′1f(y) and f(x)R
′
2f(z). Therefore,M
′, f(x) 2 ⊞ϕ.
Conversely, assume that M′, f(x) 2 ⊞ϕ, to demonstrate that M, x 2 ϕ. By assumption,
there is a y′ ∈ S′ such that f(x)R′1y
′ and M′, y′ 2 ϕ, and there is a z′ ∈ S′ such that f(x)R′2z
′
and M′, z′ 2 ¬ϕ (namely, M′, z′  ϕ). Then y′ 6= z′. Applying (Back), we derive that there
exist y, z ∈ S such that xR1y and xR2z and f(y) = y
′ and f(z) = z′. Thus M′, f(y) 2 ϕ and
M′, f(z)  ϕ. By induction hypothesis, M, y 2 ϕ and M, z  ϕ, and therefore M, x 2 ⊞ϕ, as
desired.
5 Frame definability
This section investigates the frame definability of logics L() and L(⊞). It turns out that all five
basic frame properties, i.e. seriality, reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, Euclidicity, are not definable
in both logics. For this, we adopt the notion of -morphisms on the frame level, which is obtained
from Def. 11 by leaving out the valuations.
Definition 13. Let F = 〈S,R1, R2〉 and F
′ = 〈S′, R′1, R
′
2〉 be two bimodal frames. A function
f : S → S′ is a -morphism from F to F ′, if for all x ∈ S,
(Forth) For any y, z ∈ S, if xR1y and xR2z and f(y) 6= f(z), then f(x)R
′
1f(y) and f(x)R
′
2f(z),
(Back) For all y′, z′ ∈ S′, if f(x)R′1y
′ and f(x)R′2z
′ and y′ 6= z′, then there are y, z ∈ S such that
xR1y and xR2z and f(y) = y
′ and f(z) = z′.
We say that F ′ is a -morphic image of F , if there is a surjective -morphism from F to F ′.
Proposition 14. Let F = 〈S,R1, R2〉 and F
′ = 〈S′, R′1, R
′
2〉 be two bimodal frames. If F
′ is a
-morphic image of F , then for all ϕ ∈ L() ∪ L(⊞), we have
F  ϕ⇐⇒ F ′  ϕ.
6
Proof. Assume that F ′ is a -morphic image of F . Then there is a surjective -morphism from F to
F ′, say f .
Suppose that F 2 ϕ, to show that F ′  ϕ. By supposition, there exists a valuation V on F and
s ∈ S such that 〈F , V 〉, s 2 ϕ. Define a valuation V ′ on F ′ by V ′(p) = {f(x) | x ∈ V (p)} for all
p ∈ P. Then f is a -morphism from 〈F , V 〉 to 〈F ′, V ′〉. By Prop. 12 and the fact that 〈F , V 〉, s 2 ϕ,
we obtain 〈F ′, V ′〉, f(s) 2 ϕ, and therefore F ′ 2 ϕ.
Conversely, suppose that F ′ 2 ϕ, to show that F 2 ϕ. By supposition, there is a valuation V ′ on
F ′ and s′ ∈ S′ such that 〈F ′, V ′〉, s′ 2 ϕ. Since f is surjective, there must be an s ∈ S such that
s′ = f(s). Define a valuation V on F by V (p) = {x | f(x) ∈ V ′(p)} for all p ∈ P. Then f is
a -morphism from 〈F , V 〉 to 〈F ′, V ′〉. By Prop. 12 again and the fact that 〈F ′, V ′〉, f(s) 2 ϕ, we
infer that 〈F , V 〉, s 2 ϕ, and therefore F 2 ϕ, as desired.
Proposition 15. None of seriality, reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry and Euclidicity are definable in
L() ∪ L(⊞).
Proof. Consider the following bimodal frames:
F : s 1,2 // t 1,2 // u F ′ : s′
1,2

Define a function g from F to F ′ as follows: g(s) = g(t) = g(u) = s′. It is not hard to check that
g is a surjective -morphism, thus F ′ is a -morphic image of F . By Prop. 14, F  ϕ iff F ′  ϕ for
all ϕ ∈ L() ∪ L(⊞).
If seriality were defined by a set of L()-formulas or a set of L(⊞)-formulas, say Γ, then as
F ′ is serial, F ′  Γ, and thus F  Γ, which would imply that F should be serial: a contradiction.
Thus seriality is not definable in L(). The proofs for the undefinability of other frame properties are
analogous.
The frame undefinability results can be understood in the following way: since in the figures of
Prop. 15, we have R1 = R2, and we already commented that if R1 = R2, then each of  and ⊞
becomes a non-contingency operator; moreover, none of the five basic frame properties are definable
in a logic with any non-contingency operator as a sole primitive modality [Zol99, FWvD15], thus
Prop. 15 obtains.
6 Axiomatizations for L(⊞)
This section first presents the minimal logic for L(⊞), and shows its soundness and completeness, and
then demonstrates that the same logic is also sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of
serial bimodal frames.
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6.1 The minimal logic and soundness
Definition 16. The minimal logic for L(⊞), denoted K⊞, consists of the following axioms and infer-
ence rules:
PC all instances of propositional tautologies
CON⊞ ⊞ϕ ∧⊞ψ → ⊞(ϕ ∧ ψ) ∧⊞(ϕ ∨ ψ)
DIS⊞ ⊞ϕ→ ⊞(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨⊞(ϕ ∧ χ)
MP
ϕ,ϕ→ ψ
ψ
RN⊞
ϕ
⊞ϕ ∧⊞¬ϕ
RE⊞
ϕ↔ ψ
⊞ϕ↔ ⊞ψ
Notions of deductions and theorems are defined as normal.
Recall that in the minimal noncontingency logic, the axiom∆ϕ→ ∆(ϕ∨ψ)∨∆(ϕ∧χ) (denoted
DIS∆ hereafter) can be replaced with the rule
ϕ→ ψ ψ → χ
∆ψ → ∆ϕ ∨∆χ
[Hum02, p. 110]. This also applies to
its ⊞-correspondent; more precisely, the axiom DIS⊞ is replaceable with the rule
ϕ→ ψ ψ → χ
⊞ψ → ⊞ϕ ∨⊞χ
,
given the rule RE⊞.
Also, DIS∆ can be replaced with ∆ϕ → ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ ∆(¬ϕ ∨ χ) (called ‘Kuhn’s axiom’),
and even with the formula (which is equivalent to Kuhn’s axiom) with less district schematic letters
∆ϕ→ ∆(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨∆(¬ϕ ∨ ψ), see [Hum02, pp. 110-111]. In comparison, the axiom DIS⊞ cannot
be replaced with ⊞ϕ → ⊞(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ ⊞(¬ϕ ∨ χ), neither with ⊞ϕ → ⊞(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ ⊞(¬ϕ ∨ ψ), as
illustrated below.
t : pq s : pq
1

2oo 1 // u : pq
On one hand, because R2(s)  ¬p, we have s  ⊞p. On the other hand, since R1(s) 2 p∨ q (as sR1s
and s 2 p ∨ q) and R2(s) 2 ¬(p ∨ q) (as sR2t and t  p ∨ q), it follows that s 2 ⊞(p ∨ q); moreover,
since R1(s) 2 ¬p ∨ q (as sR1u and u  p ∧ ¬q) and R2(s) 2 ¬(¬p ∨ q) (as sR2t and t  ¬p ∨ q), it
follows that s 2 ⊞(¬p ∨ q). This indicates that ⊞p→ ⊞(p ∨ q) ∨⊞(¬p ∨ q) is invalid.
Proposition 17. K⊞ is sound with respect to the class of all bimodal frames.
Proof. We take the validity of CON⊞ and DIS⊞ as examples. LetM = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 be an arbi-
trary bimodal model and s ∈ S.
Suppose thatM, s  ⊞ϕ∧⊞ψ. Then R1(s)  ϕ or R2(s)  ¬ϕ, and R1(s)  ψ or R2(s)  ¬ψ.
If R2(s)  ¬ϕ or R2(s)  ¬ψ, then R2(s)  ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ); otherwise, that is, if R1(s)  ϕ and
R1(s)  ψ, then R1(s)  ϕ ∧ ψ. Thus either R1(s)  ϕ ∧ ψ or R2(s)  ¬(ϕ ∧ ψ), and therefore
M, s  ⊞(ϕ ∧ ψ).
If R1(s)  ϕ or R1(s)  ψ, then R1(s)  ϕ ∨ ψ; otherwise, that is, if R2(s)  ¬ϕ and
R2(s)  ¬ψ, then R2(s)  ¬(ϕ∨ψ). Thus either R1(s)  ϕ∨ψ or R2(s)  ¬(ϕ∨ψ), and therefore
M, s  ⊞(ϕ ∨ ψ). Hitherto we have completed the validity of CON⊞.
Now suppose thatM, s  ⊞ϕ, then R1(s)  ϕ or R2(s)  ¬ϕ. If it is the case that R1(s)  ϕ,
then R1(s)  ϕ ∨ ψ, which implies that M, s  ⊞(ϕ ∨ ψ); if it is the case that R2(s)  ¬ϕ, then
R2(s)  ¬(ϕ ∧ χ), which entails thatM, s  ⊞(ϕ ∧ χ). Therefore,M, s  ⊞(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ ⊞(ϕ ∧ χ).
Hitherto we have completed the validity of DIS⊞.
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6.2 Completeness
This part deals with the completeness of K⊞. We adopt the standard canonical model construction.
However, a tricky thing is how to define two suitable canonical relations to handle the operator ⊞.
Definition 18. The canonical model for K⊞ is a tupleMc = 〈Sc, Rc1, R
c
2, V
c〉, where
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal K⊞-consistent set};
• sRc1t iff λ1(s) ⊆ t, where λ1(s) = {ϕ | ⊞(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for all ψ};
• sRc2u iff λ2(s) ⊆ u, where λ2(s) = {ϕ | ⊞(¬ϕ ∧ χ) ∈ s for all χ};
• V c(p) = {s ∈ Sc | p ∈ s}.
As mentioned, the semantics of ∆ is a special case of the semantics of ⊞ when R1 = R2. In that
case, we should have Rc1 = R
c
2. Indeed this is true, since in that case, ⊞ϕ ↔ ⊞¬ϕ is valid, and then
the definition of Rc2 is equivalent to that “for all ϕ, if ⊞ (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for all ψ, then ϕ ∈ t”, that is,
the definition of Rc1. And in this way, we obtain the canonical relation defined in [Kuh95] as a special
case.
Let us look at the properties of the two functions λ1 and λ2.
Proposition 19. Let s ∈ Sc. Then
(a) λ1(s) ∩ λ2(s) is nonempty. Consequently, λ1(s) and λ2(s) are both nonempty.
(b) λ1(s) and λ2(s) are both closed under conjunction. That is, if ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ λ1(s), then ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈
λ1(s), and similarly for λ2(s). Consequently, λ1(s) and λ2(s) are both closed under finite
conjunctions.
(c) If ϕ ∈ λ1(s) and ⊢ ϕ→ δ, then δ ∈ λ1(s), and similarly for λ2(s).
(d) ⊞ϕ ∈ s iff either ϕ ∈ λ1(s) or ¬ϕ ∈ λ2(s).
Proof.
(a) Since ⊢ ⊤, then applying the rule RN⊞, we have ⊢ ⊞⊤ ∧ ⊞¬⊤. By RE⊞, ⊞(⊤ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for
all ψ and ⊞(¬⊤ ∧ χ) ∈ s for all χ. Therefore, ⊤ ∈ λ1(s) ∩ λ2(s).
(b) Suppose that ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ λ1(s), then ⊞(ϕ1 ∨ ψ) ∈ s and ⊞(ϕ2 ∨ ψ) ∈ s for all ψ. Then
⊞(ϕ1 ∨ψ)∧⊞(ϕ2 ∨ψ) ∈ s. Using the axiom CON⊞, we obtain ⊞((ϕ1 ∨ψ)∧ (ϕ2 ∨ψ)) ∈ s.
Then applying the rule RE⊞, we infer that ⊞((ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)∨ψ) ∈ s. Since ψ is arbitrary, we now
conclude that ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ λ1(s).
Assume that ϕ1, ϕ2 ∈ λ2(s), then ⊞(¬ϕ1 ∧ χ) ∈ s and ⊞(¬ϕ2 ∧ χ) ∈ s for all χ. Then
⊞(¬ϕ1∧χ)∧⊞(¬ϕ2∧χ) ∈ s. Using the axiom CON⊞, we infer⊞((¬ϕ1∧χ)∨(¬ϕ2∧χ)) ∈ s.
Now applying the rule RE⊞, we obtain ⊞((¬(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2)∧χ)) ∈ s. Since χ is arbitrary, we now
conclude that ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ∈ λ2(s).
(c) Suppose ϕ ∈ λ1(s) and ⊢ ϕ→ δ, to show δ ∈ λ1(s). By supposition, it follows that ⊢ ϕ∨δ ↔
δ and ⊞(ϕ∨ψ) ∈ s for all ψ. Then ⊢ ϕ∨ (δ ∨ψ)↔ δ ∨ψ. Applying the rule RE⊞, we derive
⊢ ⊞(ϕ∨ (δ ∨ψ))↔ ⊞(δ ∨ψ). Since ⊞(ϕ∨ (δ ∨ψ)) ∈ s, we derive that ⊞(δ ∨ψ) ∈ s. Since
ψ is arbitrary, δ ∈ λ1(s).
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Now assume that ϕ ∈ λ2(s) and ⊢ ϕ → δ, to show δ ∈ λ2(s). Since ϕ ∈ λ2(s), it follows
that ⊞(¬ϕ ∧ χ) ∈ s for all χ. Since ⊢ ϕ → δ, it follows that ⊢ ¬ϕ ∧ ¬δ ↔ ¬δ, and thus
⊢ ¬ϕ∧(¬δ∧χ)↔ ¬δ∧χ. Applying the rule RE⊞, we obtain ⊢ ⊞(¬ϕ∧(¬δ∧χ))↔ ⊞(¬δ∧χ).
Since ⊞(¬ϕ ∧ (¬δ ∧ χ)) ∈ s, we get ⊞(¬δ ∧ χ) ∈ s. Since χ is arbitrary, δ ∈ λ2(s).
(d) Suppose by contraposition that ϕ /∈ λ1(s) and ¬ϕ /∈ λ2(s). Then ⊞(ϕ ∨ ψ) /∈ s for some ψ,
and ⊞(¬¬ϕ ∧ χ) /∈ s for some χ, namely ⊞(ϕ ∧ χ) /∈ s. Using the axiom DIS⊞, we obtain
immediately ⊞ϕ /∈ s.
Conversely, assume that either ϕ ∈ λ1(s) or ¬ϕ ∈ λ2(s). Then either ⊞(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for all
ψ or ⊞(ϕ ∧ χ) ∈ s for all χ. Then either case implies that ⊞ϕ ∈ s: in the first case, letting
ψ = ⊥, by RE⊞ we obtain ⊞ϕ ∈ s; in the second case, let χ = ⊤, by RE⊞ again, we infer that
⊞ϕ ∈ s. Therefore, ⊞ϕ ∈ s.
With the above results in preparation, we can obtain the following truth lemma.
Lemma 20. For all s ∈ Sc, for all ϕ ∈ L(⊞), we have
ϕ ∈ s⇐⇒Mc, s  ϕ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. The only nontrivial case is ⊞ϕ.
Assume for reductio that ⊞ϕ ∈ s butMc, s 2 ⊞ϕ. By induction hypothesis, there is a t such that
sRc1t and ϕ /∈ t, and there is a u such that sR
c
2u and ¬ϕ /∈ u. Then by definitions of R
c
1 and R
c
2,
we can obtain that ϕ /∈ λ1(s) and ¬ϕ /∈ λ2(s). This contradicts the supposition that ⊞ϕ ∈ s and
Prop. 19(d).
Conversely, suppose ⊞ϕ /∈ s, we need to find two states t and u in Sc such that sRc1t and ϕ /∈ t,
and sRc2u and ϕ ∈ u. For this, we first show that
(1) λ1(s) ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent, and
(2) λ2(s) ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
If (1) does not hold, then there exist χ1, · · · , χn ∈ λ1(s)
2 such that ⊢ χ1 ∧ · · · ∧ χn → ϕ. Since
χ1, · · · , χn ∈ λ1(s), from Prop. 19(b) it follows that χ1 ∧ · · · ∧χn ∈ λ1(s). Then due to Prop. 19(c),
we have ϕ ∈ λ1(s), by Prop. 19(d) we conclude that ⊞ϕ ∈ s, contrary to the supposition.
If (2) does not hold, then there are ψ1, · · · , ψm ∈ λ2(s)
3 such that ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψm → ¬ϕ.
Since ψ1, · · · , ψm ∈ λ2(s), it follows that ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψm ∈ λ2(s) from Prop. 19(b). Then thanks to
Prop. 19(c), we infer that ¬ϕ ∈ λ2(s), by Prop. 19(d) again, we derive that⊞ϕ ∈ s, which contradicts
the supposition again.
Then by Lindenbaum’s Lemma, we are done.
Now it is a standard exercise to show that K⊞ is the minimal logic of L(⊞).
Theorem 21. K⊞ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all bimodal frames.
2Prop. 19(a) provides the nonempty of λ1(s).
3Again, Prop. 19(a) provides the nonempty of λ2(s).
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6.3 The serial logic
In this section, we show that K⊞ is also the serial logic of L(⊞), that is to say, K⊞ is sound and
strongly complete with respect to the class of serial bimodal frames. For this, if Rc1 and R
c
2 in Def. 18
are serial, then we are done. We first have the following key observation.
Proposition 22. DefineMc as in Def. 18 and s ∈ Sc. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. Rc1(s) 6= ∅.
2. ⊥ /∈ λ1(s).
3. ⊞ψ /∈ s for some ψ.
4. ⊥ /∈ λ2(s).
5. Rc2(s) 6= ∅.
Proof. We show 1⇐⇒ 2, 2⇐⇒ 3, 3⇐⇒ 4, and 4⇐⇒ 5.
Proof. 1 ⇐⇒ 2: suppose towards contradiction that Rc1(s) 6= ∅ but ⊥ ∈ λ1(s). Then sR
c
1t for some
t ∈ Sc, that is, λ1(s) ⊆ t, and therefore ⊥ ∈ t: a contradiction. Conversely, assume that ⊥ /∈ λ1(s),
we need to show that s has a Rc1-successor. It suffices to show that λ1(s) is consistent. If not, there
exists ϕ1, · · · , ϕn ∈ λ1(s) such that ⊢ ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn → ⊥. Using items (b) and (c) of Prop. 19, we
can derive that ⊥ ∈ λ1(s), which is contrary to the assumption.
2 ⇐⇒ 3: Suppose by contraposition that ⊞ψ ∈ s for all ψ. Since ⊢ ψ ↔ ⊥ ∨ ψ, by RE⊞, it
follows that ⊢ ⊞ψ ↔ ⊞(⊥ ∨ ψ), and then ⊞(⊥ ∨ ψ) ∈ s, and therefore ⊥ ∈ λ1(s). Conversely,
assume that ⊥ ∈ λ1(s), then ⊞(⊥ ∨ ψ) ∈ s for all ψ, and thus ⊞ψ ∈ s for all ψ.
3⇐⇒ 4: similar to the proof of 2⇐⇒ 3.
4⇐⇒ 5: similar to the proof of 1⇐⇒ 2.
Corollary 23. DefineMc as in Def. 18. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
1. Rc1 is serial.
2. ⊥ /∈ λ1(s) for any s ∈ S
c.
3. ⊞ψ /∈ s for any s ∈ Sc and for some ψ.
4. ⊥ /∈ λ2(s) for any s ∈ S
c.
5. Rc2 is serial.
As we cannot exclude the possibility that ⊞ψ ∈ s for some s ∈ S and for all ψ, by the above
result, we cannot provide that Rc1 and R
c
2 are serial. We call such states s ‘endpoints’. By Prop. 22, s
has neither Rc1-successors nor R
c
2-successors.
We handle these endpoints by using a similar strategy of ‘reflexivizing the arrows in the canonical
model’ used for showing the completeness of serial contingency logic in [Hum95, FWvD15]. In detail,
defineMD = 〈Sc, RD1 , R
D
2 , V
c〉 asMc in Def. 18, except thatRDi = R
c
i∪{(s, s) | s is an endpoint}.
It should be obvious that MD is serial. Moreover, the truth values of L(⊞)-formulas are invariant
under the model transformation: for all s ∈ Sc, by Prop. 22, Rc1(s) 6= ∅ iff R
c
2(s) 6= ∅. If s is an
endpoint, then as Rc1(s) = R
c
2(s) = ∅, it holds vacuously thatM
c, s  ⊞ϕ; since s  ϕ or s  ¬ϕ
and RD1 (s) = R
D
2 (s) = {s}, we have also thatM
D, s  ⊞ϕ. If s has both Rc1- and R
c
2-successors,
then it is clear thatMc, s  ⊞ϕ iffMD, s  ⊞ϕ, as desired. Consequently,
Theorem 24. K⊞ is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of serial bimodal frames.
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7 Axiomatizations for L()
This section first provides the minimal logic for L() and shows its soundness and completeness,
then explores its extensions over special frames.
7.1 Minimal logic
Definition 25. The minimal logic of L(), denoted K, consists of the following axioms and infer-
ence rules:
PC All instances of propositional tautologies
T ⊤
EQU ϕ↔ ¬ϕ
CON ϕ ∧ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)
DIS ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨(¬ϕ ∨ χ)
MP
ϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
RE
ϕ↔ ψ
ϕ↔ ψ
The proposition below will be used in Prop. 29.
Proposition 26. The rule
ϕ→ ψ
ϕ ∧(ψ → ϕ)→ ψ
, denoted wM, is derivable inK.
Proof. Suppose that ⊢ ϕ → ψ, then ⊢ ϕ ↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ). By RE, we have ⊢ ϕ ↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ). By
axiom CON, ⊢ (ϕ → ¬ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ → ¬ψ) → ((ϕ → ¬ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ → ¬ψ)). Since ⊢ (ϕ →
¬ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ→ ¬ψ)↔ ¬ψ, by RE it follows that ⊢ ((ϕ → ¬ψ) ∧ (¬ϕ→ ¬ψ))↔ ¬ψ. Using
PC, EQU and RE, we obtain ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ (ϕ → ¬ψ) and ⊢ (ψ → ϕ) ↔ (¬ϕ → ¬ψ)
and ⊢ ¬ψ ↔ ψ, and therefore ⊢ ϕ ∧(ψ → ϕ)→ ψ.
Proposition 27. K is sound with respect to the class of all bimodal frames.
Proof. We only show the validity of axioms CON and DIS. Let M = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 be an
arbitrary bimodal model and s ∈ S.
For the validity of CON, suppose that M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ, then for all t, u such that sR1t and
sR2u, we have that (t  ϕ iff u  ϕ), and also that (t  ψ iff u  ψ), thus t  ϕ ∧ ψ iff (t  ϕ and
t  ψ) iff (u  ϕ and u  ψ) iff u  ϕ ∧ ψ, and thus s  (ϕ ∧ ψ).
For the validity of DIS, suppose thatM, s  ϕ, then for all t, u such that sR1t and sR2u, we
have that (t  ϕ iff u  ϕ). If ϕ is true at both t and u, then so is ϕ ∨ ψ; if ϕ is false at both t and
u, then ¬ϕ is true at both points, and so is ¬ϕ ∨ χ. Therefore, M, s  (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∨ χ), as
desired.
In the remainder of this subsection, we show the strong completeness of K. The following
canonical model is inspired by that of the minimal noncontingency logic in [FWvD15] and the simi-
larity between -axioms and ∆-axioms.
Definition 28. A tupleMc = {Sc, Rc1, R
c
2, V
c} is the canonical model ofK, if
• Sc = {s | s is a maximal K-consistent set},
• For i ∈ {1, 2}, sRci t iff there exists χ such that
12
1. ¬ χ ∈ s and
2. for all ϕ, if ϕ ∧(χ→ ϕ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t.
• V c(p) = {s ∈ Sc | p ∈ s}.
Note that Rc1 = R
c
2. This fact will make our proofs much more convenient.
Proposition 29. Let s ∈ Sc, ϕ /∈ s and Γ(s) = {ψ | ψ ∧(ϕ→ ψ) ∈ s}. Then
1. Γ(s) is nonempty.
2. If ψ,χ ∈ Γ(s), then ψ ∧ χ ∈ Γ(s).
3. If ψ ∈ Γ(s), then 0 ψ → ϕ.
4. Γ(s) ∪ {ϕ} and Γ(s) ∪ {¬ϕ} are both consistent.
Proof. Suppose that the preconditions hold. Then ¬ϕ /∈ s.
1. Straightforward because ⊢ ⊤.
2. Assume that ψ,χ ∈ Γ(s), then ψ ∧ (ϕ → ψ) ∈ s and χ ∧ (ϕ → χ) ∈ s. By axiom
CON, it follows that (ψ ∧ χ) ∧(ϕ→ ψ ∧ χ) ∈ s, and therefore ψ ∧ χ ∈ Γ(s).
3. Assume for reductio that ψ ∈ Γ(s) and ⊢ ψ → ϕ. Then ψ ∧ (ϕ → ψ) ∈ s and ⊢
ψ ∧ (ϕ → ψ) → ϕ (by the rule wM in Prop. 26), and therefore ϕ ∈ s, which
contradicts the supposition that ϕ /∈ s.
4. Assume that Γ(s) ∪ {ϕ} is inconsistent, then there exists ψ1, · · · , ψm ∈ Γ(s) (1 provides the
nonempty of Γ(s)) such that ⊢ ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψm → ¬ϕ. By application of 2 for m − 1 times,
we can obtain that ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ψm ∈ Γ(s), which contradicts 3. Thus Γ(s) ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
Similarly, we can conclude that Γ(s) ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent.
Lemma 30 (Truth Lemma forK). For all s ∈ Sc, for all ϕ ∈ L(), we have
Mc, s  ϕ iff ϕ ∈ s.
Proof. By induction on ϕ ∈ L(). The nontrivial case is ϕ.
Suppose that ϕ ∈ s (thus ¬ϕ ∈ s), to show thatMc, s  ϕ. If not, by induction hypothesis,
there exist t, u ∈ Sc such that sRc1t and sR
c
2u and it is not the case that (ϕ ∈ t iff ϕ ∈ u). W.l.o.g.
we may assume4 that ϕ ∈ t but ϕ /∈ u. From sRc1t, it follows that there exists χ such that ¬ χ ∈ s
and (1) for all ϕ, if ϕ ∧ (χ → ϕ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t. Since ¬ϕ /∈ t and ¬ϕ ∈ s, by (1) we have
(χ → ¬ϕ) /∈ s, namely (¬ϕ ∨ ¬χ) /∈ s. Similarly, from sRc2u and ϕ /∈ u, we can show that for
some ψ, (ψ → ϕ) /∈ s, that is, (ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) /∈ s. Now by axiom DIS, we obtain that ϕ /∈ s,
which is contrary to the supposition.
Conversely, assume that ϕ /∈ s, we need to find two states t, u ∈ Sc such that sRc1t and sR
c
2u
and it is not the case that (ϕ ∈ t iff ϕ ∈ u). Define Γ(s) as in Prop. 29. By Prop. 29.4, Γ(s) ∪ {ϕ}
and Γ(s) ∪ {¬ϕ} are both consistent. Then by Lindenbaum’s Lemma, there are two states t, u ∈ Sc
such that sRc1t and sR
c
2u such that ϕ ∈ t and ϕ /∈ u, and thus it is not the case that (ϕ ∈ t iff ϕ ∈ u),
as desired.
4This is because Rc1 = R
c
2.
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The strong completeness is now a standard exercise.
Theorem 31. K is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of all bimodal frames.
7.2 Extensions
In this section, we study the axiomatizations of L() over special frames. The following table lists
extra axioms and proof systems, and the frame properties that the corresponding systems characterize.
Notation Axioms Systems Properties
K
 seriality
T ϕ→ [ϕ→ ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ)] T = K + T reflexivity
B ϕ→ ((ϕ ∧(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬ ψ)→ χ) B = K + B symmetry
4 ϕ→ (ϕ ∨ ψ) K4 = K +4 qt&pt
5 ¬ ϕ→ (¬ ϕ ∨ ψ) K5 = K +5 qe&pe
In the above table, qt, pt, qe, pe abbreviate quasi-transitivity, pseudo-transitivity, quasi-Euclidicity and
pseudo-Euclidicity, respective, which are formalized by ∀xyz(xRiy∧ yRjz → xRjz), ∀xyz(xRiy∧
yRjz → xR1z ∧ xR2z), ∀xyz(xRiy ∧ xRjz → yRjz), and ∀xyz(xRiy ∧ xRjz → yR1z ∧ yR2z),
respectively, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
7.2.1 Serial logic
Thm. 31 shows that K is the minimal -logic. We now demonstrate that the same system is also
the serial -logic, that is, K is also sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of serial
bimodal frames. For this, we only need to show that Rc1 and R
c
2 are both serial, which though cannot
be guaranteed due to the possibility that all formulas of the form ϕ belongs to some state. Due to the
fact that Rc1 = R
c
2, we call the points that have neither R
c
1- nor R
c
2-successors ‘R
c-dead points’.5 We
handle these points by using a similar strategy to the completeness proof ofK⊞ over serial frames (see
the remarks before Thm. 24). In detail, define MD = 〈Sc, RD1 , R
D
2 , V
c〉 as Mc in Def. 28, except
that RDi = R
c
i ∪ {(s, s) | s is a R
c-dead points}. It should be obvious thatMD is serial. Moreover,
the truth values of L()-formulas are invariant under the model transformation: for all s ∈ Sc, if s
has both Rc1- and R
c
2-successors, then it is clear thatM
c, s  ϕ iffMD, s  ϕ; if s is a Rc-dead
point, thenMc, s  ϕ andMD, s  ϕ, as desired.
The above strategy indicates thatMc can be transformed into an equivalent serial bimodal model.
In the sequel, we will show a stronger result: every bimodal model can be transformed into an equiv-
alent serial bimodal model; more precisely, each bimodal model is a -morphic image of some serial
bimodal model.
Given a bimodal model M = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉, each world s in S has four possibilities: s has
neither R1-successors nor R2-successors, s has R1-successors but has no R2-successors, s has no
R1-successors but has R2-successors, s has both R1-successors and R2-successors. We handle this
four different kinds of worlds in different ways, based on the following key observations.
1. s has neither R1-successors nor R2-successors. In this case, we just add the R1 and R2 arrows
from s to itself.
5Notice that as Rc1 = R
c
2, for all s ∈ S
c, s either has both Rc1- and R
c
2-successors, or has neither of them.
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2. s has R1-successors but has no R2-successors. In this case, we first replace s with some of its
new copies, such that each copy has only one R1-successor, then add the R2-arrow from each
copy to its sole R1-successor.
3. s has no R1-successors but has R2-successors. The method for dealing with this case is similar
to that for the second case. We first replace s with some of its new copies, such that each copy
has only one R2-successor, then add the R1-arrow from each copy to its sole R2-successor.
4. s has both R1-successors (say t) and R2-successors (say u). In this case, if for instance, t lies
in the first case or the current case, we just keep the point t and the arrow from s to t. However,
if t lies in other two cases, then we cannot simply do the same thing (otherwise the truth values
of formulas may change during the tranformation); instead, we need to replace t with some of
its new copies and deal with t in the same way as in the second and third cases.
Let M = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉. Define E1 = {s ∈ S | sR1t for some t ∈ S} and E2 = {s ∈ S |
sR2t for some t ∈ S}, and let E1 = S\E1 and E2 = S\E2.
It is not hard to see that S can be partitioned into four areas: E1 ∩ E2, E1 ∩ E2, E1 ∩ E2 and
E1 ∩ E2.
Definition 32. Given any bimodal modelM = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉, we construct a bimodal modelM
′ =
〈S′, R′1, R
′
2, V
′〉, where
• S′ = (E1∩E2)∪ (E1∩E2)∪{(s, t, 1) | s ∈ E1∩E2, sR1t}∪{(s, t, 2) | s ∈ E1 ∩E2, sR2t}
• sR′1t iff one of the following conditions holds:
1. s ∈ E1 ∩ E2 and s = t
2. s ∈ E1 ∩ E2 and sR1t and t ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2)
3. s ∈ E1 ∩ E2 and t = (t
′, u, i) ∈ S′ and sR1t
′, where i ∈ {1, 2}
4. s = (s′, t, i) ∈ S′ and t ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩E2), where i ∈ {1, 2}
5. s = (s′, t′, i) ∈ S′ and t = (t′, u′, j) ∈ S′, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}
• sR′2t iff one of the following holds:
1. s ∈ E1 ∩ E2 and s = t
2. s ∈ E1 ∩ E2 and sR2t and t ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2)
3. s ∈ E1 ∩ E2 and t = (t
′, u, i) ∈ S′ and sR2t
′, where i ∈ {1, 2}
4. s = (s′′, t, i) ∈ S′ and t ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2), where i ∈ {1, 2}
5. s = (s′′, t′′, i) ∈ S′ and t = (t′′, u′′, j) ∈ S′, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}
• V ′(p) = {s ∈ S′ | g(s) ∈ V (p)}, where g is a function from S′ to S such that g(s) = s for
s ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2), and g((s, t, i)) = s for (s, t, i) ∈ S
′ where i ∈ {1, 2}.
It would be constructive to give a concrete example. We choose the following example to cover
all conditions in the definitions of the relations R′1 and R
′
2 (for the sake of simplicity, we leave out the
valuations).
15
Example 33.
u
2

(u, v, 2)
1,2

t s
1,2
oo
1
AA
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄
✄ 2 // v
1 // w =⇒ t
1,2

s
1,2
oo
1
<<
②
②
②
②
②
②
②
②
②
② 2 // (v,w, 1)
1,2
// w
1,2

In the left-hand model M, it is not hard to see that s ∈ E1 ∩ E2, u ∈ E1 ∩ E2, v ∈ E1 ∩ E2, and
t, w ∈ E1 ∩ E2. Thus in the right-hand modelM
′, s, t, w are kept unchanged, whereas u and v are
replaced by their new copies (u, v, 2) (since uR2v), (v,w, 1) (since vR1w), respectively.
Now for the arrows in M′, viz. accessibility relations. The 1- and 2-arrows from t to itself and
from w to itself are obtained from the first conditions of (the definitions of) R′1 and R
′
2. The 1- and
2-arrows from s to t follow from the second conditions of R′1 and R
′
2. The 1-arrow from s to (u, v, 2)
is derived from the third condition of R′1. The 2-arrow from s to (v,w, 1) is deduced from the third
condition of R′2. The 1- and 2-arrows from (v,w, 1) to w are inferred due to the fourth conditions of
R′1 and R
′
2. The 1- and 2-arrows from (u, v, 2) to (v,w, 1) are concluded by the fifth conditions of
R′1 and R
′
2. In this way, we transform the non-serial modelM into the desired serial modelM
′.
The following proposition states thatM′ constructed via Def. 32 is indeed serial.
Proposition 34. M′ is serial.
Proof. Let s ∈ S′ be arbitrary. We need to show that there are x, y ∈ S′ such that sR′1x and sR
′
2y.
According to the definition of S′, we distinguish the following cases.
1. s ∈ E1∩E2. Then by the first conditions of the definitions of R
′
1 and R
′
2, s is the desired x and
y.
2. s ∈ E1 ∩ E2. Then sR1t for some t ∈ S. We consider all possibilities of t as follows.
(a) t ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2). According to the second condition of the definition of R
′
1,
we have sR′1t, and thus t is the desired x.
(b) t ∈ (E1 ∩E2)∪ (E1 ∩E2). Then tRiu for some u ∈ S
c, where the value of i depends on
t: if t ∈ E1 ∩E2, then i = 1; otherwise i = 2. Then (t, u, i) ∈ S
′. According to the third
condition of the definition of R′1, we infer sR
′
1(t, u, i), thus (t, u, i) is the desired x.
We have also sR2u for some u ∈ S. With a similar argument, we can obtain sR
′
2y for some
y ∈ S′.
3. s = (s′, t, i) ∈ S′ where i ∈ {1, 2}. Then s′ ∈ Ei ∩Ej and s
′Rit, where j ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i.
Again, since t ∈ S, we consider all possibilities of t as follows.
(a) t ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2). According to the fourth conditions of the definitions of R
′
1
and R′2, we get sR
′
1t and sR
′
2t, and thus t is the desired x and y.
(b) t ∈ (E1 ∩E2)∪ (E1 ∩E2). Then tRku for some u ∈ S, where the value of k depends on
t: if t ∈ E1∩E2, then k = 1; otherwise k = 2. Then (t, u, k) ∈ S
′. According to the fifth
conditions of the definitions of R′1 and R
′
2, we have sR
′
1(t, u, k) and also sR
′
2(t, u, k),
and thus (t, u, k) is the desired x and y.
We have thus shown that in all cases, there always exist x, y ∈ S′ such that sR′1x and sR
′
2y, as
desired.
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The proposition below indicates that g satisfies the condition (Forth) of a -morphism.
Proposition 35. If sR′1t and sR
′
2u and g(t) 6= g(u), then g(s)R1g(t) and g(s)R2g(u).
Proof. Suppose that sR′1t and sR
′
2u and g(t) 6= g(u), thus t 6= u. Since s ∈ S
′, we consider the
following cases.
1. s ∈ E1 ∩ E2. According to the first condition of the definition of R
′
1 and R
′
2, we would have
s = t and s = u, which implies that t = u. Contradiction.
2. s ∈ E1 ∩ E2. Then g(s) = s. Since sR
′
1t and sR
′
2u, according to the second and third
conditions of the definitions of R′1 and R
′
2, we consider four subcases.
(a) sR1t and t ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2) and sR2u and u ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2). In this
case, we have g(t) = t and g(u) = u, and therefore g(s)R1g(t) and g(s)R2g(u).
(b) sR1t and t ∈ (E1∩E2)∪ (E1∩E2) and u = (u
′, y, i) ∈ S′ and sR2u
′, where i ∈ {1, 2}.
In this case, g(t) = t and g(u) = u′, and therefore g(s)R1g(t) and g(s)R2g(u).
(c) t = (t′, x, i) ∈ S′ and sR1t
′, where i ∈ {1, 2} and sR2u and u ∈ (E1 ∩E2)∪ (E1 ∩E2).
In this case, g(t) = t′ and g(u) = u, and then g(s)R1g(t) and g(s)R2g(u).
(d) t = (t′, x, i) ∈ S′ and sR1t
′ and u = (u′, y, j) ∈ S′ and sR2u
′, where i, j ∈ {1, 2}. In
this case, we have g(t) = t′ and g(u) = u′, and therefore g(s)R1g(t) and g(s)R2g(u).
3. s is of the form (x, y, i) ∈ S′, where i ∈ {1, 2}. Since sR′1t and sR
′
2u, according to the fourth
and fifth conditions of the definitions of R′1 and R
′
2, we consider four subcases.
(a) s = (s′, t, i) ∈ S′ and s = (s′′, u, j) ∈ S′ and t, u ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2), where
i, j ∈ {1, 2}. In this case, we would have t = u: a contradiction.
(b) s = (s′, t, i) ∈ S′ and t ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2) and u = (t, y, j) ∈ S
′, where
i, j ∈ {1, 2}. In this case, t ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2): a contradiction.
(c) s = (s′′, u, i) ∈ S′ and u ∈ (E1 ∩ E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2) and t = (u, x, j) ∈ S
′, where
i, j ∈ {1, 2}. In this case, u ∈ (E1 ∩E2) ∪ (E1 ∩ E2): a contradiction.
(d) s = (s′, t′, i) ∈ S′ and t = (t′, x, j) ∈ S′ and u = (t′, y, k) ∈ S′, where i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}.
In this case, we would have g(t) = g(u) = t′: a contradiction.
It is worth remarking that the precondition ‘g(t) 6= g(u)’ in the statement of the above proposition
cannot be weakened to ‘t 6= u’. For instance, inM, s′R1t
′ and t′R1x and t
′R1y and x 6= y but s
′ and
t′ both have no R2-successors. According to the fifth conditions of our definitions of R
′
1 and R
′
2, in
M′, (s′, t′, 1)R′1(t
′, x, 1) and (s′, t′, 1)R′2(t
′, y, 1) and (t′, x, 1) 6= (t′, y, 1). However, g(s′, t′, 1) =
s′, which implies that g(s′, t′, 1) has no R2-successors, thus we have no g(s
′, t′, 1)R2g(t
′, y, 1).
The following result states that g also satisfies the condition (Back) of a -morphism.
Proposition 36. If g(s)R1t
′ and g(s)R2u
′ and t′ 6= u′, then there are t and u in S′ such that sR′1t
and sR′2u and g(t) = t
′ and g(u) = u′.
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Proof. We show a stronger result:
(∗) If g(s)R1t
′ and g(s)R2u
′, then there are t and u in S′ such that sR′1t and sR
′
2u and g(t) = t
′
and g(u) = u′.
Assume that g(s)R1t
′ and g(s)R2u
′. It is easy to see that g(s) ∈ E1 ∩ E2. Then we must have
g(s) = s: otherwise, by the definition of g, g(s) = s′ and s = (s′, x, i) ∈ S′ where i ∈ {1, 2}, then
s′ ∈ E1 ∩ E2 and either s
′ ∈ E1 ∩ E2 or s
′ ∈ E1 ∩ E2, which is impossible. Thus sR1t
′ and sR2u
′.
Since t′ ∈ S, we have the following cases.
• t′ ∈ (E1 ∩E2)∪ (E1 ∩E2). Then by the second conditions of R
′
1, it follows that sR
′
1t
′; by the
definition of g, g(t′) = t′. Therefore, t′ is the desired t.
• t′ ∈ Ei ∩ Ej , where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. In this case, t
′Rix for some x, then (t
′, x, i) ∈ S′.
By the third condition of the definition ofR′1, sR
′
1(t
′, x, i); by the definition of g, g(t′, x, i) = t′.
Therefore, (t′, x, i) is the desired t.
We have thus shown that there exists t ∈ S′ such that sR′1t and g(t) = t
′.
Similarly, from u′ ∈ S and sR2u′, we can show that there exists u ∈ S′ such that sR′2u and
g(u) = u′, as desired.
We have now shown that g is a -morphism fromM′ toM. Then by Prop. 12, we immediately
have
Lemma 37. For all s ∈ S′, for all ϕ ∈ L(), we have
M′, s  ϕ⇐⇒M, g(s)  ϕ.
To show the completeness, we also need the following result.
Lemma 38. g is surjective.
Proof. Suppose that s ∈ S, to find a x ∈ S′ such that g(x) = s. We consider two cases.
• s ∈ (E1∩E2)∪ (E1∩E2). According to the definition of g, we have g(s) = s; clearly, s ∈ S
′.
• s ∈ Ei ∩Ej , where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. Then sRit for some t. It follows that (s, t, i) ∈ S
′.
By the definition of g, we have g(s, t, i) = s.
Theorem 39. K is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of serial bimodal frames.
Proof. Let Γ be a consistent set. By Thm. 31, Γ is satisfiable in a bimodal model, say (M, s). We
then construct M′ from M as in Def. 32. By Lemma 38, there exists x ∈ S′ such that g(x) = s,
and thusM, g(x)  Γ. Then by Lemma 37,M′, x  Γ. We also know thatM′ is serial by Prop. 34.
Therefore, Γ is satisfiable in a serial bimodal model, as desired.
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7.2.2 Reflexive logic
In this section, we show thatKT is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of reflexive
bimodal frames. As we will see, KT is also sound and strongly complete with respect to the class
of bimodal frames 〈S,R1, R2〉 where either R1 or R2 is reflexive.
Proposition 40. T is valid on the class of reflexive bimodal frames.
Proof. Let M = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 be an arbitrary reflexive bimodal model and s ∈ S. Suppose that
M, s  ϕ ∧ ϕ ∧ (ϕ → ψ), to show that s  ψ. Since s ∈ R1(s) ∩ R2(s), by Coro. 5, from
M, s  ϕ∧(ϕ→ ψ) it follows that s  ∆1ϕ∧∆2ϕ∧∆1(ϕ→ ψ)∧∆2(ϕ→ ψ). By the obtained
result,6 we can show that s  ∆1ψ ∧∆2ψ. Now using Coro. 5, we conclude thatM, s  ψ.
As one may easily verify, the above statement still holds if the class of reflexive bimodal frames
is enlarged to the class of bimodal frames where at least one accessibility relation is reflexive, that is,
T is valid over bimodal frames 〈S,R1, R2〉 where R1 or R2 is reflexive.
Definition 41. DefineMc w.r.t. KT as in Def. 28. We sayMr = 〈Sc, Rr1, R
r
2, V
c〉 is the reflexive
closure ofMc, if for all i ∈ {1, 2}, Rri is the reflexive closure of R
c
i ; in symbol, R
r
i = R
c
i ∪ {(s, s) |
s ∈ S} for i ∈ {1, 2}.
It is clear thatMr is a reflexive bimodal model.
Lemma 42 (Truth Lemma forKT). For all s ∈ Sc, for all ϕ ∈ L(), we have
ϕ ∈ s iffMr, s  ϕ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ. We only consider the nontrivial case ϕ, that is to show, ϕ ∈ s iff
Mr, s  ϕ.
‘If’: straightforward by Lemma 30 and the fact that Rci ⊆ R
r
i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
‘Only if’: Suppose, for a contradiction, that ϕ ∈ s butMr, s 2 ϕ. By induction hypothesis,
there exist t, u ∈ Sc such that sRr1t and sR
r
2u and (ϕ ∈ t 6⇐⇒ ϕ ∈ u). W.l.o.g. we may assume
that ϕ ∈ t but ϕ /∈ u. If s 6= t and s 6= u, then sRc1t and sR
c
2u, and thus the proof continues as in
the corresponding part in Lemma 30, and finally we can arrive at a contradiction. If s = t or s = u,
w.l.o.g. we assume that s = t, and thus s 6= u (as t 6= u), hence sRc2u.
Since s = t and ϕ ∈ t, we have ϕ ∈ s. Because sRc2u, there is a χ such that ¬  χ ∈ s
and (†): for all ψ, if ψ ∧ (χ → ψ) ∈ s, then ψ ∈ u. By supposition ϕ ∈ s and the fact
that ϕ /∈ u, we derive that (χ → ϕ) /∈ s, that is, (ϕ ∨ ¬χ) /∈ s. Moreover, by axiom T,
⊢ ϕ→ [ϕ→ ((ϕ→ χ)→ χ)], then as ϕ ∧ϕ ∧ ¬ χ ∈ s, (¬ϕ ∨ χ) /∈ s. Now by axiom
DIS, it follows that ϕ /∈ s: a contradiction again.
It is natural to ask if the above claim can be generalized to any bimodal model, that is, if every
bimodal model has an equivalent reflexive closure. The answer is negative. For example, the following
are a bimodal model and its reflexive closure, but one may check thatM, w  p whereasMr, w 2
p.
M w : p 1 // v : ¬p Mr w : p
1,2

1 // v : ¬p
1,2

With the soundness of K (Thm. ), Prop. 40 and its subsequent remark, Lindenbaum’s Lemma,
and Lemma 42 in hand, the following result now follows straightforwardly.
6That is, ϕ ∧∆ϕ ∧∆(ϕ→ ψ)→ ∆ψ is valid over the class of reflexive frames 〈S,R〉, see e.g. [FWvD15].
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Theorem 43. KT is sound and strongly complete with respect to the class of reflexive bimodal
frames, and also with respect to the class of bimodal frames 〈S,R1, R2〉 where either R1 or R2 is
reflexive.
7.2.3 Symmetric logic
This part deals with the soundness and strong completeness of KB over the class of symmetric
bimodal frames. For the soundness, it suffices to show the validity of B. Recall that B denotes
ϕ→ ((ϕ ∧(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬ ψ)→ χ).
Proposition 44. B is valid over the class of symmetric bimodal frames.
Proof. Let M = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 be a symmetric bimodal model and s ∈ S. Suppose, for a contra-
diction, thatM, s  ϕ butM, s 2 ((ϕ ∧ (ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬  ψ) → χ). Then there exist t, u such
that sR1t and sR2u such that it is not the case that (t  (ϕ ∧ (ϕ → ψ) ∧ ¬  ψ) → χ iff u 
(ϕ∧(ϕ→ ψ)∧¬ψ)→ χ). W.l.o.g. we may assume that u 2 (ϕ∧(ϕ→ ψ)∧¬ψ)→ χ,
i.e. u  (ϕ ∧(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬ ψ) ∧ ¬χ.7
By u  ¬ψ, there are v,w such that uR1v and uR2w and (v  ψ 6⇐⇒ w  ψ). Since sR2u and
R2 is symmetric, we have uR2s. Since s  ϕ and u  ϕ and uR1v, it follows that v  ϕ, and thus
w  ϕ. Together with (v  ψ 6⇐⇒ w  ψ), this implies that u 2 (ϕ→ ψ): a contradiction.
For the strong completeness, we adopt the following strategy: first show that KB is strongly
complete with respect to the class of quasi-symmetric bimodal frames, then demonstrate that every
quasi-symmetric bimodal model is a -morphic image of some symmetric bimodal model.
We first note that ϕ→ (ϕ ∧(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬ ψ), denoted by w  B, is derivable in KB.
Proposition 45. Let i ∈ {1, 2} and s, t ∈ Sc such that ¬ χ ∈ t. If sRci t, then tR
c
is.
Proof. Suppose, for a contradiction, that ¬  χ ∈ t and sRci t where i ∈ {1, 2} but it is not the
case that tRcis. Then from sR
c
i t, it follows that there exists ψ such that ¬  ψ ∈ s and (⋆): for
all δ, if δ ∧ (ψ → δ) ∈ s, then δ ∈ t. From ¬  χ ∈ t and ∼ tRcis, it follows that there
exists ϕ such that ϕ ∧ (χ → ϕ) ∈ t but ϕ /∈ s (that is, ¬ϕ ∈ s). By axiom B, ((¬ϕ ∧
(¬ϕ → ¬χ) ∧ ¬  ¬χ) → ¬ψ) ∈ s; by w  B, (¬ϕ ∧ (¬ϕ → ¬χ) ∧ ¬  ¬χ) ∈ s. Using
axioms Equ and PC and the rule RE, we can show that ¬(ϕ ∧ (χ → ϕ) ∧ ¬  χ) ∈ s and
(ψ → ¬(ϕ ∧ (χ → ϕ) ∧ ¬  χ)) ∈ s. Then by (⋆), ¬(ϕ ∧ (χ → ϕ) ∧ ¬  χ)) ∈ t: a
contradiction.
Proposition 46. Let s ∈ Sc. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) ¬ χ ∈ s for some χ;
(2) sRc1t for some t;
(3) sRc2u for some u.
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2)&(3) can be obtained from item 4 of Prop. 29, whereas (2) ⇒ (1) and (3) ⇒ (1)
follows from the definitions of Rc1 and R
c
2.
As a corollary of Prop. 45 and Prop. 46, we obtain the following result.
7The other case that t 2 (ϕ∧(ϕ→ ψ)∧¬ψ)→ χ can be shown similarly, by using the symmetry ofR1 instead.
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Corollary 47. Let i, j ∈ {1, 2} and s, t ∈ Sc such that tRcju for some u ∈ S
c. If sRci t, then tR
c
is.
8
Given a bimodal modelM = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉,M is quasi-symmetric, if for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, for all
s, t ∈ S with tRju for some u ∈ S, sRit implies tRis. Intuitively, for any point in a quasi-symmetric
model, if it has a successor with respect to some index, then there is a converse arrow with respect to
an index from that point to its predecessor (if any). With the notion in mind, it follows from Lemma 30
and Coro. 47 that
Theorem 48. KB is strongly complete with respect to the class of quasi-symmetric bimodal frames.
Given a quasi-symmetric bimodal model M = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉, to build a desired symmetric
bimodal model, we need only handle those states in M that have either R1-predecessors or R2-
predecessors but have neither R1-successors nor R2-successors. We collect as T1 those states inM
that have R1-predecessors but have neither R1-successors nor R2-successors, and collect as T2 those
states inM that have R2-predecessors but have neither R1-successors nor R2-successors. In symbol,
T1 = {t ∈ S | sR1t for some s ∈ S, and tR1u for no u ∈ S, and tR2v for no v ∈ S},
T2 = {t ∈ S | sR2t for some s ∈ S, and tR1u for no u ∈ S, and tR2v for no v ∈ S},
and we also define T1 = S\T1 and T2 = S\T2.
Definition 49. Given any quasi-symmetric bimodal modelM = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉, we define a bimodal
modelM+ = 〈S+, R+1 , R
+
2 , V
+〉 in which
• S+ = T1 ∪ T2 ∪ {(s, t, 1) | t ∈ T1 and sR1t} ∪ {(s, t, 2) | t ∈ T2 and sR2t}.
• sR+1 t iff one of the following conditions holds:
(i) t ∈ T1 and sR1t
(ii) t = (s, t′, 1) ∈ S+
(iii) s = (t, s′, 1) ∈ S+
• sR+2 t iff one of the following conditions holds:
(i) t ∈ T2 and sR2t
(ii) t = (s, t′′, 2) ∈ S+
(iii) s = (t, s′′, 2) ∈ S+
• V +(p) = {s ∈ S+ | h(s) ∈ V (p)}, where h is a function from S+ to S such that h(s) = s for
s ∈ T1 ∪ T2, and h((s, t, i)) = t for (s, t, i) ∈ S
+, where i ∈ {1, 2}.
Note thatM+ in [FWvD14, Def. 5.9] is a special case ofM+ here when R+1 = R
+
2 = R
+, since
Mc therein is an almost symmetric model and thus a quasi-symmetric model, and the condition that
p ∈ h(s) is equivalent to the condition that h(s) ∈ V c(p). Note that for instance, the condition (i) in
the definition of R+1 is equivalent to the more complex one ‘s, t ∈ T1 and sR1t’, since sR1t implies
8In fact, we can get an alternative result: let i, j ∈ {1, 2} and s, t ∈ Sc such that ¬  χ ∈ t. If sRci t, then tR
c
js. This
is due to the fact that Rc1 = R
c
2. But for our purpose of showing that every quasi-symmetric bimodal model is a -morphic
image of some symmetric bimodal model, we do not need the stronger correspondent (we say ‘stronger’ because in any
quasi-symmetric bimodal modelM = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉, we do not have R1 = R2 in general).
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that s ∈ T1, and similarly for other conditions. An analogous simplification goes also to the cases
(i)-(iii) in the definition R+ in [FWvD14, Def. 5.9].9
Prop. 50—Prop. 52 together say that h is a surjective -morphism, and therefore M is a -
morphic image ofM+.
Proposition 50. [Forth] If sR+1 t and sR
+
2 u and h(t) 6= h(u), then h(s)R1h(t) and h(s)R2h(u).
Proof. We show a stronger result:
(∗) If sR+1 t and sR
+
2 u and t 6= u, then h(s)R1h(t) and h(s)R2h(u).
Suppose that sR+1 t and sR
+
2 u and t 6= u. Then the arrows from s to t and u are both impossible
to be constructed by the condition (iii), since otherwise s = (t, s′, 1) and s = (u, s′′, 2), which would
entail that t = u, contradiction. In the sequel, it suffices to consider the remaining two conditions.
Since sR+1 t, if t ∈ T1 and sR1t, then obviously s ∈ T1, thus h(s) = s and h(t) = t, and therefore
h(s)R1h(t); if t = (s, t
′, 1) ∈ S+, then sR1t
′, obviously s ∈ T1, thus h(s) = s and h(t) = t
′, and
therefore h(s)R1h(t). Similarly, we can show h(s)R2h(u) by using sR
+
2 u instead.
Proposition 51. [Back] If h(s)R1t
′ and h(s)R2u
′ and t′ 6= u′, then there exist t, u ∈ S+ such that
sR+1 t, sR
+
2 u and h(t) = t
′ and h(u) = u′.
Proof. We show a stronger result:
(⋆) For any i ∈ {1, 2}, if h(s)Rit
′, then there exist t ∈ S+ such that sR+i t and h(t) = t
′.
Let i ∈ {1, 2}. Suppose that h(s)Rit
′. It is clear that h(s) ∈ T1 ∩ T2. Then it must be that
h(s) = s: otherwise, h(s) = s′ for s = (t, s′, j) ∈ S+, where j ∈ {1, 2}, which would imply that
s′ ∈ T1 ∩T2 and s
′ ∈ T1 ∪T2, which is a contradiction. Hence sRit
′. Since t′ ∈ S, t′ ∈ Ti or t
′ ∈ Ti.
If t′ ∈ Ti, then by the first condition of the definition of R
+
i , we infer sR
+
i t
′; by the definition of h,
h(t′) = t′. If t′ ∈ Ti, then (s, t′, i) ∈ S+, and thus by the second condition of the definition of R
+
i ,
we derive sR+i (s, t
′, i); by the definition of h, we get h((s, t′, i)) = t′, as desired.
Proposition 52. The function h is surjective.
Proof. Suppose that s ∈ S, we need to find a s′ ∈ S+ such that h(s′) = s.
If s ∈ T1, then s ∈ S
+ and h(s) = s; otherwise, s ∈ T1, then there exists x ∈ S such that xR1s,
thus (x, s, 1) ∈ S+, and then h((x, s, 1)) = s, as desired.
Now using Prop. 12, we immediately have
Lemma 53. For all s ∈ S+, for all ϕ ∈ L(), we have
M+, s  ϕ⇐⇒M, h(s)  ϕ.
To finish the completeness ofKB, we need also show thatM+ is symmetric.
Lemma 54. M+ is symmetric.
Proof. We need to show that R+1 and R
+
2 are both symmetric. We show only the symmetry of R
+
1 ,
since the symmetry of R+2 can be proved analogously.
Suppose for any s, t ∈ S+ we have sR+1 t, to show that tR
+
1 s. According to the definition of R
+,
we consider three conditions.
9In detail, the definition ofR+ in [FWvD14, Def. 5.9] can be simplified into the following: sR+t iff one of the following
cases holds: (i) t ∈ D and sRct, (ii) t = (s, s′) ∈ S+, (iii) s = (t, t′) ∈ S+.
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• t ∈ T1 and sR1t. Then tRju for some u ∈ S, where j ∈ {1, 2}. SinceM is quasi-symmetric,
we have tR1s. Obviously, s ∈ T1. It then follows that tR
+
1 s.
• t = (s, t′, 1) ∈ S+ for some t′. By the third condition of the definition of R+1 , it follows that
tR+1 s.
• s = (t, s′, 1) ∈ S+ for some s′. By the second condition of the definition of R+1 , it follows that
tR+1 s.
Theorem 55. KB is strongly complete with respect to the class of symmetric bimodal frames.
Proof. Let Σ be a consistent set. By Thm. 48, Σ is satisfiable in a quasi-symmetric bimodal model,
say (M, s). ConstructM+ fromM as in Def. 49. As h is surjective (Prop. 52), there exists x ∈ S+
such that h(x) = s, thusM, h(x)  Σ. By Lemma 53 and Lemma 54, Σ is satisfiable in a symmetric
bimodal modelM+, as required.
7.2.4 Transitive-like and Euclidean-like logics
In contingency logic, ∆ϕ → ∆(∆ϕ ∨ ψ) and ¬∆ϕ → ∆(¬∆ϕ ∨ ψ), are added in the minimal
contingency logic to axiomatize the class of transitive frames and the class of Euclidean frames,
respectively, see e.g. [FWvD15]. It is then quite natural to expect that their -counterparts ϕ →
(ϕ ∨ ψ) (denoted 4) and ¬  ϕ → (¬  ϕ ∨ ψ), can be used to axiomatize this generalized
logic over the same classes. Unfortunately, it turns out to be wrong, since 4 and 5 are not sound.
In what follows, instead of showing this directly, we show that one of the weaker versions of each of
them, viz. ϕ→   ϕ (denoted w4) and ¬  ϕ → ¬ ϕ (denoted w5), are invalid over the
corresponding frame class.
Proposition 56. w4 is invalid over the class of transitive bimodal frames.
Proof. Consider the following modelM = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉:
t : p
s : p 1 //
2♥♥♥♥♥♥♥
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♥♥♥♥♥♥
u : p
1

2 // w : ¬p
It can be checked easily that both R1 and R2 are transitive, and thus M is transitive. On one hand,
since all R1-successors u and R2-successors t of s agree on the truth value of p, we have s  p. On
the other hand, because some R1-successor u and someR2-successor w of u do not agree on the truth
value of p, we obtain u 2 p; since t has no any successors, t  p, and thus s 2   p. Therefore,
s 2 p→   p.
Proposition 57. w5 is invalid over the class of Euclidean bimodal frames.
Proof. Consider the following Euclidean modelM′ = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉:
s : p
1

2 // t : ¬p
2

On one hand, s  ¬  p: because sR1s and sR2t and s  p but t 2 p. On the other hand,
s 2 ¬ p: as t has only a single successor, t  p, i.e. t 2 ¬ p, and thus s 2 ¬ p. Therefore,
s 2 ¬ p→ ¬ p.
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Denote K4 = K + 4 and K5 = K + 5. As we have seen, K4 and K5 are not
the transitive -logic and Euclidean -logic, respectively. It is then natural to ask which logics both
proof systems are; in other words, which classes of frames are characterized by K4 and K5,
respectively.
We remind the reader of the properties qt, pt, qe, pe at the beginning of Sec. 7.2. It is not hard
to see that pt is stronger than qt, and pe is stronger than qe, thus every pt-frame/model is a qt-
frame/model, and every pe-frame/model is a qe-frame/model. We use Γ qt ϕ to mean that ϕ is a
semantical consequence of Γ over the class of qt-frames, that is, for every qt-model M and every
state s inM, ifM, s  ψ for all ψ ∈ Γ, thenM, s  ϕ. Similar meanings goes to Γ pt ϕ, Γ qe ϕ,
and Γ pe ϕ. We will show thatK4
 is sound and strongly complete with respect to both the class of
qt-frames and the class of pt-frames, and K5 is sound and strongly complete with respect to both
the class of qe-frames and the class of pe-frames.
Before showing the soundness and strong completeness of K4 and K5, it is worth remarking
that w4 and w5 are provable inK4 and K5, respectively, by letting ψ in 4 and 5 be ⊥.
To simplify the proofs below, we provide two useful results.
Proposition 58. Define Mc w.r.t. K4 as in Def. 28 and sRci t for i ∈ {1, 2}. If ϕ ∈ s, then
ϕ ∈ t.
Proof. Suppose that sRci t for i ∈ {1, 2} and ϕ ∈ s. Then there exists χ such that ¬  χ ∈ s and
(∗) for all ϕ, if ϕ ∧(χ→ ϕ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t.
since ϕ ∈ s, by w4, we have   ϕ ∈ s; by 4, we obtain that (ϕ ∨ ¬χ) ∈ s, that is,
(χ→ ϕ) ∈ s, then by (∗), it follows that ϕ ∈ t.
Proposition 59. Define Mc w.r.t. K5 as in Def. 28 and sRci t for i ∈ {1, 2}. If ϕ ∈ t, then
ϕ ∈ s.
Proof. Suppose that sRci t for i ∈ {1, 2} and ¬ ϕ ∈ s. Then there exists χ such that ¬ χ ∈ s and
(⋆) for all ψ, if ψ ∧(χ→ ψ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t.
since ¬ ϕ ∈ s, by w5 it follows that ¬ ϕ ∈ s; by 5, it follows that (¬ ϕ ∨ ¬χ) ∈ s,
i.e. (χ→ ¬ ϕ) ∈ s. Then using (⋆), we derive that ¬ ϕ ∈ t.
We are now ready to show the soundness and strong completeness ofK4 and K5.
Theorem 60. Let ϕ ∈ L(). The following conditions are equivalent:
(a) Γ ⊢K4 ϕ
(b) Γ qt ϕ
(c) Γ pt ϕ.
Proof. We show (a)⇒ (b)⇒ (c)⇒ (a).
(a)⇒ (b): By soundness ofK, it suffices to show that 4 is valid on the class of qt-frames.
If not, there exists a qt-modelM = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 and a state s ∈ S such thatM, s  ϕ but
s 2 (ϕ∨ψ). Then for some t and u, it holds that sR1t and sR2u and t  ϕ∨ψ 6⇐⇒ u  ϕ∨ψ.
W.l.o.g. we assume that t 2 ϕ ∨ ψ and u  ϕ ∨ ψ. From t 2 ϕ ∨ ψ it follows that t 2 ϕ, and
thus there are v,w such that tR1v and tR2w and (v  ϕ 6⇐⇒ w  ϕ). By sR1t, tR1v, tR2w and the
property (qt) ofM, we have sR1v and sR2w, which together with the fact that s  ϕ implies that
(v  ϕ⇐⇒ w  ϕ): a contradiction.
24
(b)⇒ (c): this is because every pt-model is a qt-model.
(c)⇒ (a): DefineMc w.r.t. K4 as in Def. 28. It is sufficient to show thatMc is a pt-model.
Suppose for i, j ∈ {1, 2} that sRci t and tR
c
ju. Then there exists χ such that ¬ χ ∈ s and (a) for
all ϕ, if ϕ ∧ (χ → ϕ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t, and there is a ψ such that ¬  ψ ∈ t and (b) for all ϕ, if
ϕ ∧(ψ → ϕ) ∈ t, then ϕ ∈ u. To show sRc1u and sR
c
2u, it suffices to demonstrate that for all ϕ,
if ϕ ∧ (χ → ϕ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ u. For this, let ϕ be arbitrary such that ϕ ∧ (χ → ϕ) ∈ s. In
what follows, we will show that ϕ ∧(ψ → ϕ) ∈ t, which by (b) implies that ϕ ∈ u.
• ϕ ∈ t: direct by sRci t and ϕ ∈ s and Prop. 58.
• (ψ → ϕ) ∈ t: from (χ→ ϕ) ∈ s (i.e. (¬ϕ→ ¬χ) ∈ s) and ¬χ ∈ s (i.e. ¬χ /∈ s), it
follows by axiom CON that (ϕ → ¬χ) /∈ s, namely (¬ϕ ∨ ¬χ) /∈ s. Thanks to ϕ ∈ s,
by axiom DIS we infer that (ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) ∈ s, that is, (ψ → ϕ) ∈ s. Then by Prop. 58 again,
we conclude that (ψ → ϕ) ∈ t.
Theorem 61. Let ϕ ∈ L(). The following conditions are equivalent:
(a) Γ ⊢K5 ϕ
(b) Γ qe ϕ
(c) Γ pe ϕ.
Proof. We show (a)⇒ (b)⇒ (c)⇒ (a).
(a)⇒ (b): by soundness ofK, it is sufficient to show that 5 is valid on the class of qe-frames.
If not, there exists qe-model M = 〈S,R1, R2, V 〉 and state s ∈ S such that M, s  ¬  ϕ but
s 2 (¬  ϕ ∨ ψ). From s  ¬  ϕ, it follows that for some t, u such that sR1t and sR2u and
t  ϕ 6⇐⇒ u  ϕ. From s 2 (¬  ϕ ∨ ψ), it follows that for some v,w such that sR1v and sR2w
and v  ¬ϕ∨ψ 6⇐⇒ w  ¬ϕ∨ψ. W.l.o.g. we assume that v  ¬ϕ∨ψ and w  ϕ∧¬ψ. By
sR2w and sR1t and sR2u and the property (qe) ofM, we infer wR1t and wR2u. Due to w  ϕ,
we have t  ϕ⇐⇒ u  ϕ: a contradiction.
(b)⇒ (c): This is due to the fact that every pe-model is a qe-model.
(c)⇒ (a): DefineMc w.r.t. K5 as in Def. 28. The remainder is to prove thatMc is a pe-model.
Suppose for i, j ∈ {1, 2} that sRci t and sR
c
ju. Then there exists χ such that ¬χ ∈ s and (†) for
all ϕ, if ϕ ∧ (χ→ ϕ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ t, and there is a ψ such that ¬  ψ ∈ s and (††) for all ϕ, if
ϕ ∧(ψ → ϕ) ∈ s, then ϕ ∈ u. To show tRc1u and tR
c
2u, we need to find a δ such that ¬  δ ∈ t
and for all ϕ, if ϕ ∧(δ → ϕ) ∈ t, then ϕ ∈ u. We show that χ is a desired δ.
• ¬ χ ∈ t: otherwise, by Prop. 59, we would derive χ ∈ s: a contradiction.
• Assume for any ϕ such thatϕ∧(χ→ ϕ) ∈ t, we only need show that ϕ ∈ u. By assumption
and Prop. 59, ϕ ∧ (χ → ϕ) ∈ s. As ¬  χ ∈ s, ¬χ /∈ s; as (χ → ϕ) ∈ s, (¬ϕ →
¬χ) ∈ s. Thus by axiom CON, it follows that (ϕ→ ¬χ) /∈ s, viz. (¬ϕ∨¬χ) /∈ s. From
this and ϕ ∈ s and axiom DIS, we have (ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) ∈ s, that is, (ψ → ϕ) ∈ s. Now
applying (††), we get ϕ ∈ u, as desired.
25
8 Conclusion and Future work
In this paper, we proposed the operator  for the generalized noncontingency and the operator ⊞ for
pseudo noncontingency, which are obtained by slightly adapting two equivalent semantics of noncon-
tingency operator. We showed that L() is less expressive than L(⊞) over five basic model classes.
Besides, the two logics cannot define the five basic frame properties, with the aid of a notion of
-morphisms. We then presented the minimal logic of L(⊞), which also characterizes the class of
serial bimodal frames. Moreover, we axiomatized L() over various frame classes, among which the
completeness of serial logic and of symmetric logic were shown via the notion of -morphisms.
There are a lot of future work to be continued. For instance, the axiomatizations of L(⊞) over the
class of frames with other special properties, including reflexivity, transitivity, symmetry, Euclidicity;
the axiomatizations of L() over the class of transitive frames and over the class of Euclidean frames.
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